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1 Introduction
There is considerable interest in the fiscal developments of German Länder or
states. State fiscal behavior is an important part of Germany’s overall perfor-
mance under the Stability and Growth Pact and the continuing discussion of the
merits of the Finanzausgleich, the German inter-state and federal-to-state redis-
tribution scheme for tax revenue. Lately, the failed attempt of the state of Berlin
to obtain emergency funding to cover its excessive deficits has sparked a discus-
sion of the determinants of individual fiscal performance (Konrad and Jochimsen
(2007)).
A particular interesting question is to what extent state fiscal behavior reflects
idiosyncratic factors within the control of state governments. Seitz (2007) per-
tains that existing differences in fiscal performance “seem hard to explain through
objective state-specific characteristics” (p.9, our translation). One of the reasons
could be that states have little leeway on the revenue side, where relevant tax
rates are set on the federal level and redistribution tends to equalize effective tax
receipts across states. Another reason may be that fiscal policy is mostly driven
by common factors that are similar across states and state-specific factors play
less of a role, an argument that would apply to spending as well as to revenue.
However, while the argument has some intuitive appeal, we know little about its
empirical relevance.
At first glance, both common and state-specific factors influence fiscal outcomes.
Figure 1 shows both persistence and change in the debt-to-GDP ratios of German
States over the 30-year period 1975-2004. One the one hand, almost all states
saw their debt levels increase and states with comparatively high debt levels in
1975 also tended to have high debt levels in 2004. On the other hand, some states
obviously fared worse than others, seeing their debt levels increase at a higher
speed (e.g., Bremen and Saarland), while others kept their debt levels almost
constant or even reduced them (e.g., Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Hesse).
A related question is whether the determinants of state fiscal policies are mostly
in the economic domain or whether it is politics that really matters. There is a
natural link between economic variables capturing the business cycle or structural
characteristics of a state and the behavior of its finances. Revenue flows are
clearly dependent on real activity, and so may be, through a number of channels,
expenditure. However, there is a small but growing literature that argues that,
for instance, state-specific election-constraints and government party structures
may have at least some—and mostly unwelcome—impact on fiscal performance
across states. In addition, common political factors, such as changes in political
sentiment at the national level, may play a role.
2








0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
























Note: Relation of debt to GDP in percent for all states in 1975 (x-axis) and in 2004 (y-axis).
Any observation above the dotted line implies an increase in the debt level. The rank correla-
tion between the two periods is 0.45.
Abbreviations: BW=Baden-Wuerttemberg, Ba=Bavaria, Br=Bremen, Ha=Hamburg, He=Hesse,
LS=Lower Saxony, NW=North-Rhine-Westphalia, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, Sa=Saarland,
SH=Schleswig-Holstein.
Both questions have potentially important policy implications. Arguably, it
would be more difficult to hold states responsible for their fiscal performance,
if state-specific policies had no or only very limited influence on fiscal outcomes
than otherwise. The more fiscal outcomes are determined by aggregate develop-
ments, the smaller is the influence of individual states on their fiscal performance
and vice versa. Regarding the balance of economic and political determinants,
policy recommendations will differ based on whether the former or the latter dom-
inate. If economic factors dominate, improvements in fiscal performance could
come, among other things, through better governance (e.g. lower spending given
levels of government services or real activity) or through other non-fiscal policies
(e.g. regulatory activity) aimed at improving state economic performance. If,
on the other hand, political factors dominate, improving fiscal performance may
require changes to the political framework. For instance, a lengthening of the
government period may be helpful reducing re-election constraints.
The present paper aims at answering some of these questions by exploring the
factors behind the time path of real spending and real revenue for the West Ger-
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man states between 1975 and 2004.1 The empirical approach stresses robustness:
in a first step, we identify a baseline model consisting of economic determinants
based on cyclical, structural, and fiscal indicators, as well as cross-section and
common time fixed effects. In a second step, we consider a large set of possible
political arguments, including elections and government changes, the government
party composition, political relations between the federal and the state level,
voting results, bailouts, as well as various interaction effects. Third, we combine
the economic baseline model with significant political factors to a general model
of state fiscal behavior, which allows us to decompose the time path of spend-
ing and revenues based on their economic, political, common or state-specific
determinants.
An important first result stemming from this exercise is that economic factors are
the dominant determinant of fiscal performance at the state level. There are clear
indications that cyclical indicators move spending and, in particular, revenue
procyclically in a quantitatively relevant way. In addition, fiscal decisions are
subject to solvency constraints in the sense that past fiscal performance measured
by the growth rate of the real debt level has a significant dampening effect on
spending growth, but tends to lead to higher revenue. Structural indicators,
including measures of population growth and labor market activity, play little or
no role on the economic side.
We also find that some political conditions at the state level move fiscal policy
statistically—but they hardly matter in a quantitative sense, and the effects are
not always as theoretically predicted. For instance, elections seem to have a
positive impact on real spending growth. However, the effect appears to be on
the small side, and it depends on the debatable condition of excluding so-called
Grand Coalition governments formed by the social democratic and conservative
party, which significantly reduce spending in election years. There are some scant
indications mostly on the revenue side that ideology (e.g., the type of parties in
a coalition) and, in some specifications, the political relations between state and
federal governments may matter, but the evidence is not very robust. Simulation
exercises show that political variables overall contribute little or nothing to the
explanation of the evolution of spending and revenue levels over time, which
seems almost exclusively determined by economic factors.
A last but crucial result is that common or federal-level factors, in particular
aggregated economic variables, seem to be important determinants of state fiscal
behavior. Common time fixed effects capture a large part of the time variation
of the fiscal variables, and a substantial amount of these common effects can be
explained by aggregated economic factors. For instance, the quantitative impact
1Our sample includes the states of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig Hol-
stein.
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of aggregated GDP growth on spending is higher than that of state-level GDP
and the difference is even more pronounced when it comes to revenues. Arguably,
these findings reflect a high correlation of real activity across states as well as the
effects of the fiscal redistribution scheme, which further strengthens the link of
state revenue to aggregate cyclical developments.
What, then, explains the differences in fiscal performance over time visible in
Figure 1? Our results suggest that a number of factors play a role. First, some
states show consistently higher propensities to spend then others and are, in
addition, prone to spending shocks—which can be interpreted as evidence that
differences in governance explain a relevant part of the heterogeneity in debt lev-
els. Another factor is the lack of flexibility in the fiscal strategy. While GDP
growth was highly correlated across states, there were persistent differences as
well. And because states did not adjust their GDP-elasticities for spending and
revenue growth accordingly, this translated into diverging fiscal outcomes. This
implies that ensuring flexibility in terms of fiscal strategy and addressing gov-
ernance problems are important ingredients for any policy aimed at improving
fiscal outcomes at the state level.
In what follows, Section 2 provides a short survey of the related literature, Section
3 describes our data set, Section 4 presents the empirical models and results, and
Section 5 applies these findings to decompose state fiscal performance over time.
Section 6 explains why some states fared better than others and looks for policy
conclusions. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A number of papers investigates the political economy of Länder fiscal policy
in recent years using modern panel data approaches—with mixed results. As
far as conventional political business cycle theory is concerned, Galli and Rossi
(2002), Rodden (2006), and Margraf (2007) find some support for the idea of
election-related opportunistic fiscal policies. Bischoff and Gohout (2006) report
opportunistic influences in government tax projections. In contrast, Seitz (2000)
and Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) do not find election effects. Potrafke (2006)
finds evidence for ideological or partisan politics in some subcategories of public
spending at the state level, a result that, at the aggregate level, has been rejected
by the vast majority of the literature so far.
Going beyond traditional political business cycle arguments, Jochimsen and Nuscheler
(2007) and Margraf (2007) show that fiscal behavior may be influenced by the
character of the state government, in particular the number of parties involved in
a coalition. Finally, Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2007) present evidence that higher
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debts and deficits per capita increase the risk of a financial bailout.
While a number of factors may be in play, differences in model specification are
likely to explain some of the differences in findings. The literature uses different
samples and various estimation techniques. For instance, some papers look at the
period 1970-2000s, applying sophisticated dynamic panel estimators, while others
focus on a subsample and use simple OLS approaches.2 However, at least since
Sala-I-Martin (1997), it is well known that variable selection is among the most
important influences in empirical frameworks with a large number of potential
explanatory variables, both on the economic and the political side, and little
common theoretical ground to restrict the empirical framework.
Our main contribution to this debate is to systematically consider a wide range
of economic and political variables and evaluate their relative importance in a
robust empirical framework. Like the literature so far, the approach encompasses
a number of tests based on political economy considerations, but general idea is
to describe in full the determinants of fiscal policy at the state level.
3 Data
To describe the fiscal behavior of German states in full, we focus on the real
growth in spending and revenue of both the central (i.e., state government) and
the local (i.e., municipal) level. Central and local fiscal decisions are intertwined
in various ways, and the allocation of fiscal responsibilities varies across states—
which suggests an aggregate perspective.3
In addition, we consider about 70 economic and political variables linked to the
development of state finances, resulting in a panel covering the years 1975 to
2004 and 10 German states. We exclude East German states and Berlin, which
offer a significantly shorter time span of observations and are subject to various
specific post-unification conditions. Our average empirical models include 290
observations. We will discuss the data in some detail below.
Standard stationarity tests indicate that the relevant fiscal variables as well as
their potential economic determinants are, as a rule, non-stationary and show no
2Seitz (sample: 70-96), Rodden (75-93), Jochimsen and Nuscheler (60-05), and Margraf
(71-05; excluding Bremen) employ dynamic panel methods, with Seitz and Rodden relying on
OLS, Jochimsen and Nuscheler on a Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator (LSDV), and
Margraf on a GMM approach. Bischoff and Gohout (92-02) estimate a random effects OLS
model, Galli and Rossi (74-94; including Berlin) a fixed effects GLS model, and Heppke-Falk
and Wolff (93-05) a fixed effects instrumental variable regression. Potrafke (74-04) estimates a
SUR model.
3For lack of better alternatives we use state specific GDP-deflators to produce series of real
spending and revenues.
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systematic cointegration relationships, suggesting an empirical approach based
on first differences or growth rates (see Appendix A). This holds for the various
indicators of real activity (e.g., real GDP, unemployment), structural measures
(e.g., population, sectoral composition), as well as for the dependent variables.
For easier interpretation, (annual) growth rates are used were applicable.
A striking feature of many state variables is their comovement, making it crucial
to consider federal (or common) variables in the empirical model as well. For
instance, indicators of real activity tend to be highly correlated across states,
pointing to a high degree of cross-sectional integration. In principle, certain
political factors, for instance, a change in the party composition of federal gov-
ernment, could also have national repercussions. We will take this into account
by adding common time fixed effects or, alternatively measures of aggregated
economic activity as well as common political variables to the empirical model.
3.1 Economic Variables
Indicators of economic developments at the state and federal level that could
potentially shape state fiscal behavior fall into three broad categories. Measures
of cyclical or growth activity include real GDP growth, growth in unemployment
and employment, and the real interest rate. Figure 2 shows that real GDP growth
and the change in real spending and revenue over the full 1975-2004 period are
positively correlated, which supports the notion that this group of variables may
indeed be a relevant determinant of fiscal behavior.
Measures of structural economic development include population growth, pop-
ulation density, the share of industrial production in overall output, as well as
variables that capture the size of states, for instance, the level of real GDP,
geographic size, urbanity, average population level, or the presence of foreign
borders. In addition, there is reason to consider other exogenous factors at the
federal level such as the occurrence of common oil price hikes (in the form of
an impulse dummy variable), possible effects of German unification (as impulse
dummy), or otherwise unspecified common longer-term developments (as a linear
trend).
Finally, past fiscal performance may, and perhaps should, have repercussions
on present expenditure and revenue decisions. For instance, state governments
under a binding intertemporal budget constraint could be expected to adjust
contemporary fiscal policies in light of past growth rates of the their real debt
level.
Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix B present descriptions and descriptive statistics
for all economic and political variables (see below) discussed. Data sources are
described in Table A3.
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Note: Annual average change in real GDP levels (x-axis) and the average annual change in real
spending and revenue levels between 1975 and 2004 in percent.
Abbreviations: BW=Baden-Wuerttemberg, Ba=Bavaria, Br=Bremen, Ha=Hamburg, He=Hesse,
LS=Lower Saxony, NW=North-Rhine-Westphalia, RP=Rhineland-Palatinate, Sa=Saarland,
SH=Schleswig-Holstein.
3.2 Political variables
We consider a wide range of political variables covering the structure of state
governments, political relations between the federal and the state level, voting
results at the state and federal level, the party composition of state governments,
elections and changes in state governments, and the bailouts of certain state
governments during the 1990s. In addition, we look at interaction effects of
elections and changes in state governments with pre- and post-change government
party compositions.
The structure of state governments may shape fiscal behavior through a variety
of channels, such as the differences in political dynamics depending on coalition
form or the political standing of the Minister of Finance. The relevant group of
variables includes the number of parties in a government coalition, the number
of ministries, the share of ministries held by the party of the Prime Minister,
and the similarity of party affiliation of the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Finance.
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Political relations between the federal and the state level could be influential
because Germany’s constitutions allows a majority of state governments to in-
teract with the federal government across a wide area of policy fields through
the Bundesrat (or Senate). This is particularly relevant for fiscal policy, as the
Bundesrat holds veto power over any federal law intervening in state finances, for
example, by implying changes in state-level expenditures. To capture some of the
relevant political constellations, we construct variables that capture similarities
in a state government’s party composition with that of the federal government
as well as potential conflicts between the political majority within the Bundesrat
and federal government (based on the the party affiliation of Prime Ministers).
Changing political moods captured by party voting results may also influence fis-
cal policy, for instance, if certain parties were associated with particular spending
programs. Due to Bundesrat-federal government interaction and also because
voting trends at the federal level may be indicative of overall political tendencies,
both federal and state level voting results will be considered. Following similar
arguments, there is reason to include variables measuring the party composition
of state governments like the presence of a Grand Coalition between the social
democrats (SPD) and the conservative party (CDU4)—the two parties dominat-
ing German post-war politics.
Standard political business cycle theory suggests that elections may play a role in
fiscal policy by, among other things, creating incentives for increasing spending
and lowering revenue prior to a ballot. On the other hand, there could be reason
to implement fiscal policy changes just after an election—a necessary expenditure
cut, say—to exploit the political cycle. Figure 3 shows that average state real
spending growth was indeed somewhat higher in election periods and tended to be
just slightly lower in post- than in pre-election periods. The question is, whether
this finding can be reproduced in a more robust empirical setup.
Along the same line, any political change may shape fiscal policy, for instance, the
substitution of the Prime Minister or a reshuﬄe of the governing party coalition.
In addition, because the party composition of governments could influence the
way elections or political changes impact fiscal policy, we also consider interaction
effects.
Lastly, we construct a set of variables indicating the occurrence of fiscal bailouts.
During the 1990s, two German states (Bremen and Saarland) obtained emergency
financing through the Finanzausgleich inter-state redistribution scheme for tax
revenue and from the federal government. These variables should help answer
the question whether these bailouts had lasting effects on the fiscal behavior of
the beneficiaries or the other states in the sample.
4The conservative party is represented by the CSU in Bavaria, but by the CDU elsewhere.
In what follows, we will use the CDU synonymously for both.
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tion. Dotted lines show 95% confidence interval.
4 Model and Results
4.1 Preliminaries
Based on the time series properties of the data discussed in Section 3, we opt for a
Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) approach in the empirical application.
The FGLS estimator robustly deals with possible problems of autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity, while avoiding some of the problems associated with dynamic
panel estimators. Even though dynamic models can be valuable tools in the
presence of strong persistence in explanatory variables, their validity crucially
depends on the availability of strong instruments. What is more, including a
lagged endogenous variable may make it difficult to identify the economic forces
driving the possible persistence of the endogenous variable. For instance, the
observed inertia (if any) in real expenditure or revenue growth rates may well
be due to inertia in relevant determinants such as real GDP and interest rates.
The FGLS models estimated below show a robust relation between expenditure
or revenue growth and their economic determinants and little or no residual
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autocorrelation.5
Our empirical strategy follows three steps: first, we establish a baseline model
for real expenditure and revenue growth based on economic determinants alone;
second, we identify political variables that, in addition, have empirical impact;
third, we integrate both economic and political factors in a general model of fis-
cal behavior. The general model allows a discussion of the relative strength of
economic and political determinants of fiscal behavior and is used for a decom-
position of the evolution of the fiscal position of German states in Section 5. A
variety of robustness checks will be discussed, including alternative estimators
and model selection techniques.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Economic Baseline Model
The search for a economic baseline model starts with the complete set of cyclical,
structural, and fiscal performance variables discussed above, as well as one-period
lagged values of these variables. We then narrow the model down by dropping
variables with a p-value larger than 0.1. The procedure is applied separately to
spending and revenue, resulting in two separate economic baseline models, which
we then complement by cross-section and time fixed effects.
Tables 1 and 2 present the resulting models for real spending and revenue growth
after eliminating non-significant current or lagged economic variables.6 In the
case of spending, the baseline model in column (1) includes as explanatory vari-
ables lagged real GDP growth at the state level (∆gdp(lag)), lagged real GDP
growth at the federal level (∆bund_gdp(lag)), the change of the real interest rate
at the federal level (∆interest), lagged state population growth (∆population(lag)),
state unemployment growth (∆unemployed), the lagged growth rate of the real
debt level (∆debt(lag)), as well as a dummy variable capturing the oil price
hikes of the 1970s (oil), and a linear trend (trend). The model also includes a
dummy controlling for technical changes in national accounting methods in 1998
(dummy).
5Note that this holds irrespective of the inclusion of other fiscal variables such as lagged real
debt growth. Dynamic models will be estimated as a robustness check.
6The full set of economic variables entering the general model (not shown; results available
on request) is listed in the upper panel of Table 2. The variables that do not show a significant
impact either in their lagged or current form include ∆urbanity (change of percentage of popu-
lation living in urban areas), ratio_frontier (percentage of state border with other countries),
area (state size), and ∆density (change in population density).
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Table 1. Baseline model: economic determinants of spending
∆spending (1) (2) (3) (4)
β p β p β p β p
∆gdp(lag) 0.2391 0.008 0.2842 0.005 0.1499 0.099 0.1637 0.097
∆bund_gdp(lag) 0.3509 0.003 0.2843 0.032
∆interest 0.0034 0.012 0.0032 0.016
∆population(lag) 0.3203 0.082 0.3740 0.071 0.3781 0.208 0.6111 0.209
∆unemployed -0.0408 0.000 -0.0413 0.000 -0.0186 0.136 -0.0196 0.120
∆debt(lag) -0.0524 0.073 -0.0666 0.029 -0.0526 0.095 -0.0674 0.047
oil 0.0224 0.000 0.0224 0.000
dummy(=1998) -0.1097 0.000 -0.1093 0.000
trend -0.0005 0.003 -0.0006 0.001
Bavaria 0.0002 0.963 0.0013 0.738
Bremen 0.0032 0.570 0.0042 0.502
Hamburg 0.0040 0.536 0.0028 0.671
Hesse 0.0009 0.857 0.0018 0.666
Lower Saxony 0.0011 0.838 0.0013 0.763
N. Rhine-Westph. 0.0049 0.294 0.0049 0.251
Rhine. Palatinate 0.0012 0.802 0.0013 0.751
Saarland 0.0011 0.819 0.0022 0.685
Schles.-Holst. 0.0018 0.702 0.0020 0.625
1976 -0.0305 0.278 -0.0309 0.276
1977 -0.0403 0.150 -0.0415 0.142
1978 -0.0189 0.505 -0.0216 0.453
1979 -0.0035 0.902 -0.0063 0.830
1980 -0.0126 0.661 -0.0159 0.584
1981 -0.0414 0.124 -0.0443 0.106
1982 -0.0626 0.020 -0.0651 0.017
1983 -0.0558 0.040 -0.0577 0.036
1984 -0.0500 0.072 -0.0524 0.063
1985 -0.0223 0.419 -0.0245 0.380
1986 -0.0329 0.247 -0.0356 0.216
1987 -0.0326 0.245 -0.0362 0.205
1988 -0.0412 0.149 -0.0443 0.128
1989 -0.0316 0.270 -0.0361 0.220
1990 -0.0265 0.362 -0.0326 0.283
1991 -0.0294 0.328 -0.0376 0.246
1992 -0.0238 0.404 -0.0304 0.313
1993 -0.0473 0.089 -0.0532 0.069
1994 -0.0532 0.063 -0.0580 0.052
1995 -0.0414 0.147 -0.0460 0.118
1996 -0.0523 0.068 -0.0566 0.055
1997 -0.0643 0.021 -0.0680 0.018
1998 -0.1526 0.000 -0.1565 0.000
1999 -0.0394 0.167 -0.0434 0.137
2000 -0.0330 0.256 -0.0374 0.209
2001 -0.0446 0.116 -0.0489 0.092
2002 -0.0570 0.041 -0.0608 0.033
2003 -0.0440 0.113 -0.0476 0.094
2004 -0.0645 0.021 -0.0676 0.018
Cons 0.0134 0.020 0.0139 0.044 0.0503 0.073 0.0517 0.071
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Table 2. Baseline model: economic determinants of revenue
∆revenue (1) (2) (3) (4)
β p β p β p β p
∆gdp 0.3981 0.001 0.3465 0.012 0.4449 0.000 0.3875 0.004
∆bund_gdp 0.6816 0.000 0.7366 0.000
∆bund_gdp(lag) 0.3116 0.027 0.3141 0.025
∆interest -0.0067 0.002 -0.0065 0.002
∆interest(lag) -0.0028 0.089 -0.0026 0.105
∆debt(lag) 0.0796 0.046 0.0883 0.036 0.0870 0.026 0.0988 0.020
∆unemployed(lag) 0.0206 0.028 0.0200 0.034 -0.0282 0.065 -0.0286 0.063
unification(=1990) -0.0355 0.000 -0.0354 0.000
dummy(=1998) -0.0771 0.000 -0.0769 0.000
trend -0.0006 0.001 -0.0006 0.001
Bavaria 0.0023 0.535 0.0012 0.673
Bremen -0.0042 0.649 -0.0038 0.629
Hamburg -0.0047 0.326 -0.0044 0.409
Hesse 0.0002 0.970 0.0001 0.971
Lower Saxony -0.0004 0.907 -0.0005 0.892
N. Rhine-Westph. 0.0000 0.999 -0.0002 0.950
Rhine. Palatinate -0.0005 0.907 -0.0008 0.791
Saarland -0.0011 0.866 -0.0015 0.758
Schles.-Holst. -0.0006 0.846 -0.0014 0.657
1977 -0.0113 0.506 -0.0122 0.477
1978 -0.0376 0.020 -0.0376 0.020
1979 -0.0400 0.021 -0.0396 0.023
1980 -0.0336 0.068 -0.0348 0.062
1981 -0.0859 0.000 -0.0880 0.000
1982 -0.0530 0.000 -0.0557 0.000
1983 -0.0407 0.002 -0.0419 0.001
1984 -0.0383 0.004 -0.0385 0.004
1985 -0.0310 0.059 -0.0319 0.054
1986 -0.0486 0.002 -0.0489 0.002
1987 -0.0451 0.012 -0.0459 0.011
1988 -0.0365 0.024 -0.0365 0.024
1989 -0.0242 0.164 -0.0240 0.167
1990 -0.0754 0.000 -0.0737 0.000
1991 -0.0307 0.082 -0.0296 0.094
1992 -0.0272 0.157 -0.0282 0.146
1993 -0.0405 0.029 -0.0436 0.023
1994 -0.0432 0.003 -0.0441 0.003
1995 -0.0568 0.000 -0.0575 0.000
1996 -0.0448 0.013 -0.0461 0.011
1997 -0.0745 0.000 -0.0756 0.000
1998 -0.1260 0.000 -0.1268 0.000
1999 -0.0332 0.064 -0.0339 0.060
2000 -0.0505 0.005 -0.0503 0.005
2001 -0.1018 0.000 -0.1030 0.000
2002 -0.0805 0.000 -0.0821 0.000
2003 -0.0646 0.000 -0.0665 0.000
2004 -0.0458 0.003 -0.0467 0.002
Cons -0.0065 0.342 -0.0071 0.302 0.0494 0.004 0.0512 0.004
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A number of results deserve commenting. First, expenditure growth seems to be
procyclical. Lagged real GDP growth at the federal and state level has a sig-
nificant positive and state-level unemployment growth has a significant negative
impact on spending. To the extent that real interest rate changes also follow the
business cycle, the estimated positive (albeit only marginally significant) coeffi-
cient points in the same direction. In addition, of course, higher interest rate
expenditures will also play a role.
Second, structural elements hardly matter. Only higher population growth is,
after a one-year lag, associated with higher state spending, perhaps reflecting the
need to scale the provision of publicly provided goods and services such as school-
ing and other infrastructure to population size. But the estimated coefficient is
only significant at the 9 percent level.
Third, there are signs that spending decisions are subject to solvency constraints
in the sense that the growth rate of the real debt level lagged one period has
a marginally significant negative effect on real spending. In other words, state
expenditure does not evolve independently of the overall fiscal situation.
Turning to revenue, it is interesting to note that the baseline model, after elim-
inating insignificant variables, contains a similar set of determinants as the ex-
penditure case (Table 2, column (1)).7 These include ∆gdp, ∆bund_gdp and its
lag, ∆interest and its lag, ∆debt(lag), ∆unemployed(lag), dummy and trend.
Finally, unification, an impulse-dummy controlling for effects of the German
unification, plays a significant role. The significant positive reaction of real rev-
enue growth to GDP is hardly surprising. Interestingly, interest rates have a
negative effect on revenue. One interpretation is that interest rates are nega-
tively related to asset prices and, thus, to revenue stemming from corporate and
income taxation.
Standard Hausman tests imply that the baseline models may benefit from adding
cross-section and period fixed effects.8 Thus, Tables 1 and 2 in columns (2)-(4)
also provide results for augmented models with fixed effects. With the possible
exception of North Rhine-Westphalia in the spending model, the fixed cross-
section effects matter neither statistically nor economically. However, the period
fixed effects are often significant, and their inclusion impacts the results for the
state-specific economic variables in the spending model. While these variables
continue to produce p-values at least bordering significance, only debt remains
significant at conventional levels in column (4) of Table 1. The picture changes,
however, once we allow for political variables and eliminate insignificant period
effects (see below).
7Results for the model including the full set of current and lagged economic variables avail-
able on request.
8Test results available on request.
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In the revenue model, GDP growth as well debt seem unaffected by the inclusion
of common period fixed effects, while unemployment becomes statistically less
important.
Note that ∆interest, ∆bund_gdp, as well as the time dummies and the trend
variable are common across states and, therefore, excluded from the column (3)
and (4) models that include period fixed effects.
4.2.2 Adding Political Variables
In a second step, the economic baseline models are expanded to include political
arguments as additional explanatory variables. To get a first idea which political
factors may influence fiscal behavior in addition to the economic forces at work,
we added—one at a time—each of the 55 political variables listed in Table A2
to the baseline models with cross-section and time period fixed effects. Tables 3
and 4 (upper panels) report the significantly estimated coefficients of the added
variables for spending and revenue, respectively.9
The results allow for the possibility that politics matter for state fiscal behavior—
albeit not always as conventional theory would suggest. Looking at spending,
first, the number of parties in a government coalition (coal_size) seems to have a
positive and marginally significant impact, which seems to be in line with the idea
that fiscal discipline suffers when political responsibility is shared (Roubini and
Sachs (1988), Alesina and Perotti (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1999)). It is less
clear, however, why a change in government resulting in a coalition of the con-
servative CDU and market-oriented, liberal FDP (change_gov_CDU_FDP )
may to lead to higher real expenditure growth. Similarly, higher spending under
a conservative-liberal coalition overall (CDU_FDP_gov) seems to be at odds
with the classical idea of partisan politics put forward by Hibbs (1977).10 Also the
stipulation by Nordhaus (1975) of opportunistic spending in election years is at
odds with lower election year expenditures under a Grand Coalition government
(election_grand_coal). On the other hand, real spending is higher in election
years under governments other than Grand Coalitions, perhaps because, for ide-
ological reasons outside the Nordhaus model, both parties in a Grand Coalition
government prefer the present arrangement to end. Interestingly, and also dis-
tinctively not in line with the Nordhaus model, we find that expenditure growth is
lower in the year following state elections (lag_election). A possible explanation
is that fiscal consolidation efforts are concentrated in the post-election period.
Finally, there are indications (marginally significant) that expenditure followed a
less expansionary path in the state of Saarland after the bailout (bailout_Saar).
9We will comment on the findings excluding fixed effects (lower panels) below.
10Both variables are not significant at conventional levels, though.
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Table 3. Political determinants of spending
β p with economic model with fixed effects
coal_size 0.0038 0.054 yes yes
CDU_FDP_gov 0.0051 0.085 yes yes
lag_election -0.0045 0.032 yes yes
bailout_saar -0.0120 0.064 yes yes
change_gov_CDU_FDP 0.0142 0.200 yes yes
election_grand_coal -0.0326 0.008 yes yes
∆_bund_FDP_vote 0.0176 0.009 yes no
SPD_FDP_gov 0.0050 0.075 yes no
change_mp 0.0098 0.049 yes no
lag_election -0.0055 0.013 yes no
bailout_Saar -0.0093 0.062 yes no
election_grand_coal -0.0268 0.032 yes no
change_gov_CDU_alone 0.0121 0.071 yes no
lag_election_CDU_FDP -0.0112 0.088 yes no
lag_election_SPD_alone -0.0071 0.075 yes no
Table 4. Political determinants of revenue
β p with economic model with fixed effects
∆CDU_vote 0.0394 0.066 yes yes
grand_coal -0.0152 0.028 yes yes
ampel_gov 0.0604 0.010 yes yes
preelect_grand_coal -0.0288 0.025 yes yes
SPD_bund_land -0.0080 0.012 yes no
∆CDU_vote 0.0369 0.096 yes no
ampel_gov 0.0636 0.012 yes no
bailout -0.0089 0.090 yes no
preelect_grand_coal -0.0258 0.049 yes no
preelect_SPD_Green 0.0150 0.048 yes no
lag_election_CDU_alone 0.0100 0.015 yes no
lag_election_SPD_Green -0.0148 0.057 yes no
bund_SPD_FDP_gov -0.0074 0.084 yes no
∆bund_CDU_vote -0.0550 0.061 yes no
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The results pertaining to revenue growth are also open to interpretation, but
it would seem that variables describing government ideology or party composi-
tion are more relevant than election-related or partisan factors. For instance,
Grand Coalitions seem to be associated with periods of lower revenue growth
(grand_coal), including before elections (prelect_grand_coal). On the other
hand, a higher number of votes for the conservative party (∆CDU_vote), seem
to be associated with a positive revenue effect at marginal significance levels.
This also holds for a three party coalition consisting of social democrats, liberals,
and the Green Party (ampel_gov).
4.2.3 General Model
Finally, we expand the economic baseline models by including all political vari-
ables identified above. This leaves us with large models including up to 10
variables plus fixed effects, of which not all are significant. After eliminating
non-significant variables and fixed effects using standard information criteria, we
arrive at the general specifications presented in Table 5 for real spending growth
and in Table 6 for real revenue growth.
The results confirm that state-specific economic factors help determine real spend-
ing and revenue growth. Looking at the expenditure side first, quantitatively, a
one percentage point increase of lagged real GDP growth leads to about 0.2 per-
centage points higher spending growth. At about 0.03, the estimated impact for a
similar decrease in unemployment growth is somewhat lower, and higher real debt
growth of one percentage point reduces spending growth by about 0.1 percentage
points— also not an irrelevant number. Population growth, with a coefficient
estimate of about 0.8, has the strongest effect on spending growth, but Table A2
shows that ∆population is a sluggishly moving time series with a comparatively
low standard deviation over the sample period. Regarding revenue, a one percent
increase in lagged real GDP growth leads to higher revenue growth of almost 0.6
percentage points, or about thrice the impact on expenditure growth, while the
impact of changes in real debt growth are of a similar magnitude.
Turning to the political determinants, not all of the variables identified in the pre-
vious section are significant at conventional levels when entered simultaneously,
and their quantitative effect is small compared to the economic variables. Spend-
ing growth increases by about 0.02 percentage points after government changes
resulting in a conservative-liberal coalition government, decreases by about 0.05
percentage points in election years under a Grand Coalition, and is about 0.006
percentage points lower in post-election years than otherwise. In addition, spend-
ing growth in the state of Saarland is estimated to have been about 0.02 percent-
age points lower after the bailout in the early 1990s. As to revenue, we find that
coalitions involving the social democrats, liberals, and the Green Party enjoyed
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about 0.05 percentage points higher revenue growth than other governments,
while Grand Coalition governments saw their revenue growth reduced in pre-
election years. In addition, revenue growth was higher in state-periods during
which the conservative vote share was increasing.
While these results remain hard to interpret consistently, it would seem that fiscal
spending is more sensitive to election-related factors, while fiscal revenue tend to
be mostly influenced by partisan elements.

























































Importantly, Tables 5 and 6 also reveal that common period fixed effects might
have been a crucial factor for the development of state fiscal behavior. In the
spending model, the size and sign pattern of the estimated period effects suggests
that common (or federal-level) developments helped shaping the time path of
expenditure across states—a suspicion that we will follow-up on further below.
The results for revenue growth point in a similar direction, even though in this
case the negative sign on all estimated time fixed effects could be indicating that
common factors are not be the only force at work.
Finally, cross-section fixed effects also play a role for spending behavior in selected
states. While we do not find significant state fixed effects on the revenue side,
real spending growth was significantly higher in the Saarland, Bremen, and North
Rhine-Westphalia compared to the average state in the sample. The results imply
that spending growth was between about 0.005 and 0.01 percentage points per
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annum higher than elsewhere. Accumulated over the sample period and keeping
everything else constant, this amounts to expenditure levels between about 15
and 30 percent higher than in the average state at the end of the sample period.
4.2.4 Going Beyond Fixed Effects
The role fixed time effects play in the determination of expenditure and revenue
invites further scrutiny—in particular, it would be interesting to learn whether
the factors driving fiscal behavior picked up by the time fixed effects can be
associated with common economic or common political factors. To shed light on
this question, we repeat the exercise above without fixed effects and including
common economic and political variables instead.
The starting point are the economic baseline models (1) in Tables 1 and 2 that,
while excluding fixed effects, allow for a common linear trend and selected dummy
variables. Adding political variables with a significant impact on revenue and
spending as listed in Tables 3 and 4 (lower panels) and eliminating variables based
on standard information criteria yields alternative general models for expenditure
and revenue. The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
Not surprisingly, the alternative general models include a larger number of eco-
nomic and political variables. For spending, now aggregate (or federal) GDP
growth (∆bund_gdp(lag)) and interest rate changes (∆interest) matter, which
further stresses the business cycle component in real expenditure growth. As to
the political determinants, the additional variables include changes in the Prime
Minister position (change_mp) as well as the change in liberal votes at the
federal level (∆bund_FDP_vote) and lag_election_CDU_FDP , albeit both
only at the 10 percent level. At the same time, change_gov_CDU_FDP and
election_grand_coal cease to play a significant role.11
For the alternative revenue model, we find that additional business cycle-related
variables enter the frame, including ∆unemployed(lag), aggregate GDP growth
(∆bund_gdp, ∆bund_gdp(lag)) and the change in the common interest rate
(∆interest, ∆interest(lag)). In addition, a number of political variables, not
present in the fixed effects model in Table 8, matter. These include measures
related to elections (prelect_SPD_Green, lag_election_CDU_alone) and the
coincidence of left-wing government participation at the federal and state level
(SPD_bund_land), which tends to be associated with lower revenue growth.
This also holds in periods of increasing votes for the conservative party at the
federal level (∆bund_CDU_vote).
11The stronger showing of some state-level political variables could hint at common under-
lying political trends. See below.
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Among other things, the alternative general model results show that the com-
mon federal business cycle is more important for the cyclicality of fiscal be-
havior than state-level developments. For spending, the quantitative impact of
∆bund_gdp(lag) exceeds that of ∆gdp(lag) by more than 0.1 percentage points.
One reason will be the high degree of correlation between state-level developments
and, thus, between state-level and aggregate GDP growth. The difference is even
more pronounced when it comes to revenues, were the impact of ∆bund_gdp
exceeds the impact of state-specific GDP growth by a factor larger than two and,
in addition, enters significantly in lagged form. Plausibly, this result is due to the
fact that tax bases are similar and the inter-state fiscal redistribution scheme of
the Finanzausgleich which further strengthens the link of tax revenue to aggre-
gate cyclical developments.
The exclusion fixed time effects further complicates the interpretation of the
results for the political variables in the model, but it would seem that the stronger
showing of some state-level variables could be caused by common trends. For
instance, the increase in relevance of election-related variables on the revenue
model indicates a certain degree of coordination of election dates. And one of
the factors behind the influence of federal voting trends may be that, during
the sample period, ideological changes tended to be correlated across states—a
development picked up by the common fixed time effects in the previous model.
Most importantly, however, the results suggest that common economic factors
are behind the time fixed effects in the general models. The quantitative impact
of aggregate GDP growth on both spending and revenue relative to state-specific
GDP growth has already been noted. At the same time, the federal-level political
variables relevant in Tables 7 and 8 remain of smaller quantitative importance
comparable to or smaller than state-level political variables.
4.2.5 Robustness
As a first robustness check, we re-estimate the general model using a dynamic
panel framework with an Arellano-Bond estimator. We find broadly similar re-
sults with somewhat larger coefficients for the state-specific economic variables.
However, the lagged spending and revenue variables tend to come out insignificant
across a number of instrument specifications, which suggests the FGLS results
presented above provide reliable estimates.12
We also find only very limited evidence of heterogeneity in the estimated gen-
eral models. For revenue, based on conventional Chow tests, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the coefficients for the economic or political determinants in
12Our simulation results in Section 5 are very robust to changes in the estimator. Additional
results available on request.
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the general models in Tables 7 and 8 are similar across states for real revenue.
For spending, there are indications of heterogeneity with regard to the impact of
∆gdp(lag). For instance, we find that, compared to the average state, changes
in real GDP have a slightly smaller procyclical impact on real spending growth
in Bavaria, but a larger impact in Baden-Wuerttemberg. In addition, the reac-
tion to lag_election somewhat differs across states. Overall, however, the panel
approach seems to fit the data well.
A final robustness test addresses variable selection. Extreme Bounds Analysis
(EBA) proposed by Sala-I-Martin (1997) is a means to test whether the eco-
nomic and political variables to be included in the general model are indeed
robustly connected with our fiscal variables. The principle idea of an EBA is to
test explanatory variables by running a large number of regressions with varying
combinations of alternative exogenous determinants. The estimated models have
the form
y = β · x+ α · z + γ · c+ ε, (1)
where y is the endogenous variable (either real revenue or real spending growth),
x is the economic or political variable of interest, z represents a vector of other
economic or political variables, c is a given and unchanging vector of controls, and
ε is an error term. For each of the about 70 economic and political variables in our
data we run a series of regressions where z contains one variable or any possible
combination of two variables out of the remaining set of explanatory variables
(contemporaneous or lagged). This leads to over two thousand regressions for
each variable x. Appendix D reports the EBA results with time and country fixed
effects as controls c and the results with trend, dummy, oil and unification as
controls c.
The EBA-based general models are very similar to the models discussed ear-
lier. To get to a general model, we included all variables robustly connected
with revenue and expenditure growth as well the corresponding control variables
and again applied standard information criteria to narrow the resulting mod-
els down—according the the EBA analysis. As to spending, the specification in
Table A5 (Appendix E) resembles Table 5 with the main exceptions being that
population growth and changes in unemployment no longer are selected into the
model.13 The EBA-based results for revenue shown in Table A6 include two addi-
tional variables compared to Table 6, but these changes are hardly fundamental.14
And both EBA-based models agree with the earlier findings that the quantitative
impact of the economics determinants dominate that of political variables.
13In addition, GDP growth also enters lagged, only one (marginally significant) state fixed
effect is included, and bailout_Saar is missing compared to Table 5.
14Additional variables in Table 12 are SPD_bund_land and ∆unemployed(lag).
23
5 Decomposing State Fiscal Performance Over Time
The previous section suggests that economic as well as political factors at the state
and federal level shape fiscal policy decisions overall, and it will be interesting to
learn more about what this implies for state fiscal performance over time.
To shed further light on the determinants of fiscal behavior, we propose a simple
decomposition exercise. The principle idea is to construct counterfactual time
paths of real spending and revenue levels based on the general models discussed
in Section 4.2.3, taken the levels at the beginning of the sample period as given
and focusing on one particular channel at a time. For instance, to single out the
impact of state-specific economic factors on the time path of real spending in a
particular state, we produce an index with a starting value of 100 that changes
in line with actual observations for GDP, population, unemployment, and debt,
weighted by the respective coefficients presented in Table 5. The resulting series
illustrates the counterfactual development of that state’s real expenditure levels
over the sample period if only state-specific economic factors had played a role.
The same procedure can illustrate the role of idiosyncratic political factors, as
well as the specific relevance of common time effects factors and state fixed effects.
Finally, there are the residual factors to consider. In addition to the state-by-state
results, we also produce (GDP-weighted) aggregate decompositions. Appendix C
discusses the procedure in more detail.
5.1 Results
Figure 4 presents the results for real spending levels. Focusing, first, on the
aggregate, common developments captured by time fixed effects are clearly the
dominating force, suggesting a spending path closely resembling actual fiscal de-
velopments. In contrast, the counterfactual time paths based on state-specific
economic factors show considerably smaller, and those based on state fixed ef-
fects or political and residual factors hardly show any resemblance with actual
developments.
The relative strong influence of common factors on expenditure growth during
the sample period does not necessarily imply that states were not responsible
for fiscal outcomes. For instance, one interpretation of this result could be that
states acted deliberately in a coordinated fashion when changing expenditure
flows. But these findings should certainly be kept in mind when considering the
scope of individual states to shape their fiscal performance.
The picture is somewhat more differentiated when we turn to aggregated real
revenue. While common fixed effects closely track changes in actual revenue lev-
els, state-specific economic factors seem to explain much of the overall trend over
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the sample period. State-specific political factors, on the other hand, contribute
almost nothing to the time path of real revenue, and neither do the residuals
from the estimated model. The implication is that state-specific real economic
activity plays a more important role for the explanation of state fiscal behavior
on the revenue than on the spending side.
Given the importance of common or fixed time effects in particular for spending,
we further decompose these effects based on the empirical model allowing for
common political and economic variables (see Tables 7 and 8). Figures 6 and 7
present the results for the aggregate, while state-by-state results can be found in
Appendix C. The figures clearly illustrate that common economic factors matter
most for the overall trend of spending and revenue, while common political factors
remain mostly irrelevant. This also implies that the coordination of fiscal action
across states was not so much a political phenomenon but triggered, for instance,
by the shared aggregate business cycle.
A final question is how sensitive the decomposition results are to a change in
specification? As a robustness check, we repeat the above exercise for the EBA-
based general models with fixed effects and without fixed effects (see Figures
A3-A6 in Appendix E). There are two interesting observations. First, the change
in specification brought about by the EBA selection procedure tends to heighten
the impact of state-specific economic factors compared to the results in Figures
4 and 5. At the same time, however, there is little or no change regarding the
relative unimportance of state-specific political factors. What is more, when using
the EBA-based model without fixed effects to disentangle common economic from
common political factors, we still find common economic factors to be by far more
important in determining expenditure and revenue growth than state-specific
economic factors.
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6 Why Did Some States Fare Better Than Oth-
ers?
The results so far pose an interesting puzzle: while the determinants of fiscal
policies appear to be rather similar across states, states’ fiscal performance is
not. Figure 1 depicts a common upward trend in the development of debt, but
also divergence (see Section 1). For example, Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg,
and Hesse show very moderate increases in their debt-to-GDP levels (or, indeed,
none at all), while others like Bremen and Saarland, saw their debt levels increase
steeply during the 1975-2004 period.15 The question is, then, why some states
fared better than others.
Part of the explanation will be differences in governance. Two of our empiri-
cal results point in this direction. First, governance deficits are a likely factor
behind the significant cross-section fixed effects for some states in the spending
model. This is in line with standard theories of political economy arguing that
bureaucracies, if unchecked, aim at growing the public budget beyond the so-
cial optimum (Niskanen (1971)).16 Second, the fact that the residual component
plays a relatively larger role in some states also suggests governance plays a role.
As Leibenstein (1966) demonstrated, administrative slack (or “X-inefficiency”)
will increase the level of spending for any level of public services provided. As a
consequence, deficits in governance can result in a permanent increase of the ex-
penditure level and a one-time reduction of spending growth. While the evidence
is indirect, it is interesting to note that Bremen and Saarland feature prominently
in both areas discussed. Saarland and Bremen are also the only states where po-
litical factors are at least of some importance for the development of expenditure
(Figure 4).17
Table 9 illustrates that governance problems may have a relevant dimension. The
table groups states by average debt-to-GDP ratios over the sample period into
“low” (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse), “high” (Bremen and Saarland),
and “middle” debt states (all others). On the revenue side, we find that high debt
states had slower actual revenue growth over the 1975-2004 period than either
middle or low debt states, and that a large part of this shortfall can be attributed
to residuals factors as estimated in the general model (see Table 6). Residual
factors imply about 11 percentage points lower revenue growth in high debt states
15Bremen and Saarland also show the highest average debt-to-GDP ratio in our sample
period.
16Alternatively, but less plausibly, one could argue for a constant preference for higher spend-
ing growth in these states.
17Interestingly, these factors work in an unexpected direction: in both states political forces
contributed to lower spending growth toward the end of the sample period. In the case of
Bremen, political factors are also related to higher revenue growth in this period (Figure 5).
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compared to middle debt states and about 14 percentage points compared to low
debt states. This is a significant part of the overall difference in revenue growth
of about 14 and 25 percentage points, respectively.18 On the spending side, fixed
state effects are mostly present in high debt states, implying higher spending
growth of about 27 percentage points compared to middle debt states and of
about 28 percentage points compared to low debt states, on average. Residual
factors play a minor role in this case, but point into a similar direction.
Table 9. Real revenue and spending change 1975-2004 in percent by debt group
and as implied by selected determinants
Low Middle High
Actual revenue change 41.56 31.24 17.05
Change implied by residuals 1.41 -0.29 -11.70
Change implied by state fixed effects - - -
Change implied by GDP growth 48.34 30.14 26.68
Actual spending change 30.80 24.91 14.12
Change implied by residuals -1.44 0.95 0.34
Change implied by state fixed effects 0.00 8.52 28.10
Change implied by GDP growth 16.25 10.10 9.47
Note: Actual changes 1975-2004 for actual revenue and spending and predicted changes based
on selected determinants from the general models estimated in Tables 5 and 6. The predicted
changes are computed akin to the simulation exercises in the previous section. The debt groups
are defined as “Low”: Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse; “Middle”: Hamburg, Lower
Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein; and “High:
Bremen and Saarland. Group data are time-variant weighted averages, which weights based on
real spending and revenue levels, respectively.
In addition to governance, fiscal strategy plays an important role in explaining
differing fiscal performances: similar policies can lead to vastly different out-
comes in the face of divergent economic developments.19 Table 9 shows that real
revenue growth linked to real GDP growth in low debt states by far exceeds rev-
enue growth of other states. Given that the estimated GDP-elasticity of revenue
18Note that revenue and spending growth implied by the determinants listed in Table 9 do
not sum to the observed actual changes. The list of determinants is intentionally incomplete
and the simulation techniques used imply rescaling all series to 100 in 1975.
19Note that we can exclude reverse causality running from growth to fiscal policy. For in-
stance, estimating the general models for real revenue and spending growth with real GDP
growth suitably instrumented by real investment growth and common period fixed effects yields
coefficients similar to the ones reported in Tables 5 and 6. Additional results available on re-
quest. Also note that state-level GDP enters the general model for spending with a one-period
lag.
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growth are the same, this means that during the sample period low debt states
profited from higher average GDP growth. High GDP growth also implied higher
spending growth in low debt states compared to middle, and high debt states.
However, because the given estimated GDP-elasticity for revenue exceeds that for
spending (see Tables 5 and 6), these differences are small compared to revenue
growth.
The mismatch between fiscal strategy and economic growth in the high debt
states is quantitatively relevant. During 1975-2004, high debt states saw GDP-
induced revenue growth that was about 3 and 22 percentage points lower than
in middle and low debt states, respectively. At the same time, GDP-induced
spending growth in high debt states was only 1/2 a percentage point lower than
in middle debt states and about 6 percentage points higher than in low debt
states.
For illustrative purposes, consider the thought experiment of changing the fiscal
strategy given the actual time path of state GDP. Had the high debt states
followed a counterfactual fiscal strategy with the elasticity of spending vis-à-vis
state GDP at half of its actual value, GDP-induced spending growth would have
been about 4.5 percent. This would have implied an increase in the difference to
low debt states to about 10 percentage points. And increasing the GDP-elasticity
of revenue by half of its actual value would have boosted GDP-induced revenue
growth to about 42 percent, an outcome very close to the 48 percent computed
for low debt states.
These findings hold important policy conclusions. First, addressing governance
problems would be helpful in improving states’ fiscal performance. The evidence
discussed here is indicative in nature, but it points to otherwise unexplained
systematic differences in fiscal behavior that are large enough to warrant further
scrutiny. Second, flexibility in terms of fiscal strategy is important. It seems
clear that high debt states suffered from a lack of flexibility in terms of fiscal
strategy. Their debt-to-GDP ratio would have been lower, if they had deviated
from the strategy of coupling spending behavior and GDP growth to the same
extent as states with lower debt levels and tied revenue growth more tightly to
GDP growth than these states. A corollary of this result is that, to the extent
that state governments lack this kind of flexibility because their fiscal behavior
is pre-determined at the federal level, such constraints need to be lifted.20
20Differences in non-fiscal economic policies may contribute to fiscal success. Arguably states
influence regional real activity through a variety of regulatory measures, which, in turn, shape
revenue and spending growth. Of course, fiscal policies other than changes in the overall revenue
or spending levels may also play a role in this regard—for instance, the allocation of spending
to different budget items. The analysis of fiscal behavior at lower levels of aggregation is clearly
an area for further research.
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7 Conclusions
A lively debate has ensued on the fiscal developments of German Länder or state
finances and their possible determinants. While some argue that differences in
fiscal behavior are hard to explain by state-specific characteristics, others suggest
that political-economy models may be helpful in this respect. However, so far
surprisingly little is known about the relative importance of the various determi-
nants of fiscal behavior at the state level. Attempting to fill this void, this paper
explores the factors behind the time path of real state spending and revenue from
1975 to 2004. The empirical approach stresses robustness and considers a large
set of economic and political variables.
A number of results are worth mentioning. First, common economic factors are
an important determinant of state fiscal performance. In particular, we find that
common period fixed effects are the quantitatively and statistically dominant
factor driving fiscal outcomes over time, and much of this shared behavior stems
from aggregate real GDP growth. In other words, the common business cycle is a
key determinant of fiscal policy (even) at the state level. This finding applies to
fiscal policy overall, but it is especially strong on the spending side. Second, that
said, state-specific economic developments are also relevant. Specifically, indica-
tors of state cyclical real activity and states’ overall fiscal standing (measured
by lagged real debt growth) influence spending and, to an even larger degree,
revenue developments. On the other hand, structural indicators play little or
no role. Lastly, the influence of political factors, common and state-specific, is
limited both in statistical and quantitative terms. There are, for example, some
indications of opportunistic election-oriented spending behavior, but the effect is
conditional on certain party constellations and hardly relevant quantitatively.
An interesting puzzle suggested by these results is that the determinants of fiscal
policies appear to be rather similar across states, but fiscal performance is not.
During 1975-2004, some states such as Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, or Hesse
showed no or very moderate increases in their debt-to-GDP levels, while others,
such as Bremen and Saarland, saw their debt levels increase steeply.
Our results show that a number of factors may have played a role — with im-
portant policy conclusions. There is, for instance, support for Seitz (2007), who
suspects that governance differences help in explaining the heterogeneity of debt
levels. In particular, some states have consistently higher propensities to spend
then others and tend to suffer from otherwise hard-to-explain shocks to their
spending levels. Another factor explaining different fiscal outcomes is the lack
of flexibility in fiscal strategy in the face of diverging economic developments.
We find, for example, that the failure of some states to downward adjust their
propensity to spend in light of a their relatively weak GDP growth performance
contributed to their comparatively dismal fiscal performance. This suggests that
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addressing governance problems and ensuring flexibility in terms of fiscal strategy
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Appendix
A. Time Series Characteristics
Several panel unit root tests exist. These test can be classified in two groups: tests
for a common unit root for the panel and tests for an individual unit root for the
cross-sections. Because of a lack of power of these tests, tests from both groups
are used to increase reliability of the results, with the Breitung test (Breitung
(2000)) representing the common and the Fisher test (Maddala and Wu (1999)
and Choi (2001)) representing the individual unit root test. The results indicate,
that the level of the economic variables and that of political variables describing
the percentage of votes a party gets are non-stationary, while the growth rates
are.
With variables in levels being non-stationary, the possibility of a cointegration
relationship has to be considered. Cointegration tests for panels have been in-
troduced by Pedroni (1999). However, results indicate that neither revenue nor
spending are cointegrated with basic economic variables. Consequently, the esti-
mation is done in growth rates.
Test statistics available on request.
B. Data Descriptions
Table A1. Description of Variables
Variable Description
Economic variables
∆spending real spending (growth rates)
∆revenue real revenue (growth rates)
∆gdp real GDP (growth rates)
∆bund_gdp real GDP Germany (growth rates)
∆interest real interest rate Germany (first difference)
∆unemployed number of unemployed (growth rates)
∆employed number of employed (growth rates)
∆population population (growth rates)
∆debt real debt (capitalmarket) (growth rates)
∆ratio_industry ratio of industrial sector of total value added (first difference)
∆urbanity ratio of population in cities with more than 100 000 residents (compared to state population)
ratio_frontier ratio of frontier with foreign countries (compared to frontier of Germany)
area area
∆density area per population (first difference)
Structure of state governments
coal_size number of parties in government
treasury dummy, 1 if minister of finance and prime minister are in the same party
minist number of ministries
minist_ratio number of ministries held by party of prime minister
Relations between federal and state level
SPD_bund_land dummy, 1 if SPD in Länder government and federal government
CDU_bund_land dummy, 1 if CDU in Länder government and federal government
FDP_bund_land dummy, 1 if FDP in Länder government and federal government
Gruene_bund_land dummy, 1 if Green Party in Länder government and federal government
br_bund dummy, 1 if party of chancellor has the majority in the Bundesrat
br_land dummy, 1 if party of prime minister has the majority in the Bundesrat
br_bund_land dummy, 1 if party of chancellor and prime minister has the majority in the Bundesrat
Voting results state and federal level
∆SPD_vote percentage of votes for SPD (growth rates)
∆CDU_vote percentage of votes for CDU (growth rates)
∆FDP_vote percentage of votes for FDP (growth rates)
∆Gruene_vote percentage of votes for Green Party (growth rates)
∆bund_SPD_vote percentage of votes for SPD - federal election (growth rates)
∆bund_CDU_vote percentage of votes for CDU - federal election (growth rates)
∆bund_FDP_vote percentage of votes for FDP - federal election (growth rates)
∆bund_Gruene_vote percentage of votes for Green Party - federal election (growth rates)
Party composition of state and federal governments
SPD_Green_gov dummy, 1 if coaltion with SPD and Green Party
SPD_FDP_gov dummy, 1 if coaltion with SPD and FDP
CDU_FDP_gov dummy, 1 if coaltion with CDU and FDP
ampel_gov dummy, 1 if coalition with SPD, FDP and Green Party (traffic light coalition)
grand_coal dummy, 1 if big coalition
bund_SPD_FDP_gov dummy, 1 if federal coaltion with SPD and FDP
bund_CDU_FDP_gov dummy, 1 if federal coalition with CDU and FDP
Changes in state government
change_gov dummy, 1 if change of parties in government
change_gov_aggr cumulative sum of changes of the government
change_mp dummy, 1 if change of the prime minister
preelect dummy, 1 if year before election
election dummy, 1 if year of election
lagelection dummy, 1 if year after election
Table A1. Description of Variables (continued)
Variable Description
Bailout
bailout dummy, 1 for 1994-2004 for Bremen and Saarland (financial support from the other Länder)
bailout_hb dummy, 1 for 1994-2004 for Bremen (financial support from the other Länder)
bailout_saar dummy, 1 for 1994-2004 for Saarland (financial support from the other Länder)
Interaction effects of changes in state governments
change_gov_coalition dummy, 1 if coalition after change of government
preelect_coalition dummy, 1 if coalition in year before an election
election_coalition dummy, 1 if coalition in year of election
lagelection_coalition dummy, 1 if coalition in year after an election
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
∆spending 292 0.0079 0.0330 -0.1298 0.0884
∆revenue 292 0.0091 0.0423 -0.1238 0.2227
∆gdp 340 0.0196 0.0207 -0.0485 0.0723
∆bund_gdp 340 0.0223 0.0168 -0.0087 0.0526
∆interest 330 -0.0223 0.8736 -1.3137 1.9926
∆unemployed 328 0.0798 0.2362 -0.6109 1.0093
∆employed 340 0.0024 0.0193 -0.0660 0.0682
∆population 340 0.0021 0.0063 -0.0139 0.0230
∆ratio_industry 340 -0.0050 0.0078 -0.0322 0.0173
∆debt 340 0.0435 0.0465 -0.1302 0.2582
∆urbanity 340 -0.0001 0.0085 -0.0289 0.0918
ratio_frontier 350 0.2654 0.1983 0.0000 0.6147
area 350 24845.59 21494.83 404.23 70549.19
∆density 340 -0.0001 0.0069 -0.0235 0.0404
coal_size 350 1.4429 0.5254 1 3
treasury 350 0.9571 0.2028 0 1
minist 350 9.1686 1.7288 6 14
minist_ratio 350 0.8958 0.1417 0.5 1
SPD_bund_land 350 0.2629 0.4408 0 1
CDU_bund_land 350 0.1771 0.3823 0 1
FDP_bund_land 350 0.2171 0.4129 0 1
Gruene_bund_land 350 0.0429 0.2028 0 1
br_bund 350 0.3714 0.4839 0 1
br_land 350 0.6029 0.4900 0 1
br_bund_land 350 0.1943 0.3962 0 1
∆SPD_vote 340 -0.0046 0.0641 -0.3814 0.2827
∆CDU_vote 340 -0.0003 0.0698 -0.3863 0.5886
∆FDP_vote 340 -0.0076 0.2225 -1.0275 0.9163
∆Gruene_vote 240 0.0315 0.1900 -0.5416 1.3863
∆bund_SPD_vote 340 -0.0053 0.0454 -0.1646 0.0922
∆bund_CDU_vote 340 -0.0030 0.0415 -0.1160 0.1166
∆bund_FDP_vote 340 0.0072 0.1500 -0.4664 0.3704
∆bund_Gruene_vote 230 0.0759 0.3119 -0.5068 1.3173
SPD_Green_gov 350 0.1114 0.3151 0 1
SPD_FDP_gov 350 0.1600 0.3671 0 1
CDU_FDP_gov 350 0.1143 0.3186 0 1
grand_coal 350 0.0457 0.2092 0 1
ampel_gov 350 0.0086 0.0923 0 1
bund_SPD_FDP_gov 350 0.3714 0.4839 0 1
bund_CDU_FDP_gov 350 0.4571 0.4989 0 1
change_gov 350 0.1086 0.3115 0 1
change_gov_aggr 350 1.1171 0.9960 0 5
change_mp 350 0.0314 0.1747 0 1
preelect 350 0.2429 0.4294 0 1
election 350 0.2543 0.4361 0 1
lagelection 340 0.2559 0.4370 0 1
bailout 350 0.3143 0.4649 0 1
bailout_hb 350 0.0314 0.1747 0 1
bailout_saar 350 0.0314 0.1747 0 1
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics (continued)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
change_gov_SPD_Gruene 350 0.0171 0.1300 0 1
change_gov_SPD_FDP 350 0.0143 0.1188 0 1
change_gov_CDU_FDP 350 0.0200 0.1402 0 1
change_gov_grand_coal 350 0.0057 0.0755 0 1
change_gov_SPD_alone 350 0.0229 0.1497 0 1
change_gov_CDU_alone 350 0.0229 0.1497 0 1
preelect_SPD_Gruene 350 0.0257 0.1585 0 1
preelect_SPD_FDP 350 0.0343 0.1822 0 1
preelect_CDU_FDP 350 0.0286 0.1668 0 1
preelect_grand_coal 350 0.0114 0.1064 0 1
preelect_SPD_alone 350 0.0600 0.2378 0 1
preelect_CDU_alone 350 0.0743 0.2626 0 1
election_SPD_Gruene 340 0.0206 0.1422 0 1
election_SPD_FDP 340 0.0353 0.1848 0 1
election_CDU_FDP 340 0.0294 0.1692 0 1
election_grand_coal 340 0.0118 0.1080 0 1
election_SPD_alone 340 0.0618 0.2411 0 1
election_CDU_alone 340 0.0765 0.2661 0 1
lagelection_SPD_Gruene 340 0.0235 0.1518 0 1
lagelection_SPD_FDP 340 0.0382 0.1920 0 1
lagelection_CDU_FDP 340 0.0206 0.1422 0 1
lagelection_grand_coal 340 0.0118 0.1080 0 1
lagelection_SPD_alone 340 0.0676 0.2515 0 1
lagelection_CDU_alone 340 0.0853 0.2797 0 1















coal_size Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
treasury Statistische Landesämter and Staatskanzleien
minist Statistische Landesämter and Staatskanzleien
minist_ratio Statistische Landesämter and Staatskanzleien
br_bund Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
br_land Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
SPD_vote Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
CDU_vote Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
FDP_vote Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
Gruene_vote Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
bund_SPD_vote Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
bund_CDU_vote Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
bund_FDP_vote Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
bund_Gruene_vote Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
SPD_gov Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
CDu_gov Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
FDP_gov Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
Gruene_gov Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
bund_SPD_gov Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
bund_Gruene_gov Datenhandbuch Deutscher Bundestag
change_gov Statistische Landesämter and Staatskanzleien
change_gov_aggr Statistische Landesämter and Staatskanzleien
change_mp Statistische Landesämter and Staatskanzleien
election Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2007) and own adjustments
C. Decomposition
The estimated models of growth rates for revenue and spending allow a decom-
position of actual revenue and spending into an economic, political, fixed effects
and residual part at the state level. We calculate indices It (with a starting point
of 100) for each component and cross-section
It = It−1(1 + growth ratet) (2)
based on the estimated growth rates
ŷ = Ĉons+ β̂ec · xec + β̂pol · xpol + β̂fe · xfe (3)
with ŷ representing either revenue or spending. To identify the economic (the
political) part of the estimated growth rate, all coefficients except those for the
economic variables, β̂ec, (for the political variables, β̂pol) are set equal to 0. The
contribution of the fixed effects includes the constant. Then, for the residual
part the difference between the actual growth rate of revenue and spending,
respectively, and the their estimations are calculated. The resulting indices for
each cross-section and an weighted average for all states are shown in Figures 4-7
and A1-A6.21
21Weights are based on real spending and revenue levels, respectively, and change over time.
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Reported are the average coefficient β¯ of all regressions for each variable, the
share of regressions in which the variable is significant at least on the 10 percent
level, and the unweighted cumulative distribution function CDF (0) proposed by
Sala-i-Martin (1997). The CDF (0) gives the larger fraction of the cumulative
distribution function lying on one side of zero, i.e. 0.5 ≤ CDF (0) ≤ 1. A
variable is considered to have a robust influence on the dependant variable, if
CDF (0) > 0.95.
Table A1. EBA with fixed effects: spending
Variable β significant CDF
∆gdp 0.2250 0.99 0.98
∆gdp(lag) 0.1833 0.94 0.96
∆unemployed -0.0201 0.34 0.94
∆unemployed(lag) -0.0174 0.06 0.92
∆employed 0.0619 0.00 0.76
∆employed(lag) -0.0601 0.00 0.76
∆population 0.2467 0.00 0.71
∆population(lag) 0.4853 0.00 0.84
∆debt(lag) -0.0638 0.93 0.97
∆ratio_industry 0.3011 0.55 0.95
∆ratio_industry(lag) 0.3508 0.97 0.97
∆urbanity 0.2515 0.20 0.94
∆urbanity(lag) -0.0054 0.00 0.53
ratio_frontier 0.0113 0.00 0.85
area 0.0000 0.00 0.71
∆density -0.0104 0.00 0.54
coal_size 0.0033 0.32 0.93
treasury -0.0075 0.06 0.79
minist -0.0002 0.00 0.59
minist_ratio -0.0035 0.00 0.70
SPD_bund_land -0.0040 0.05 0.91
CDU_bund_land -0.0006 0.00 0.60
FDP_bund_land 0.0019 0.00 0.77
Green_bund_land -0.0003 0.00 0.56
br_land 0.0006 0.00 0.64
br_bund_land -0.0002 0.00 0.56
∆CDU_vote -0.0225 0.09 0.92
∆FDP_vote -0.0073 0.10 0.93
Table A1. EBA with fixed effects: spending (continued)
Variable β significant CDF
SPD_Green_gov -0.0002 0.00 0.57
SPD_FDP_gov 0.0026 0.03 0.80
CDU_FDP_gov 0.0040 0.05 0.90
grand_coal -0.0081 0.10 0.90
ampel_gov -0.0065 0.00 0.71
change_gov 0.0023 0.00 0.76
change_gov_aggr 0.0001 0.00 0.57
change_mp 0.0068 0.02 0.90
preelect 0.0012 0.00 0.70
election -0.0009 0.00 0.65
lag_election -0.0043 0.93 0.97
bailout_HB -0.0070 0.04 0.81
bailout_Saar -0.0065 0.03 0.84
change_gov_SPD_Green -0.0035 0.00 0.70
change_gov_SPD_FDP -0.0004 0.00 0.54
change_gov_CDU_FDP 0.0138 1.00 0.98
change_gov_grand_coal -0.0079 0.00 0.70
change_gov_SPD_alone 0.0045 0.00 0.73
change_gov_CDU_alone -0.0036 0.00 0.68
preelect_SPD_Green 0.0065 0.00 0.88
preelect_SPD_FDP -0.0086 0.12 0.93
preelect_CDU_FDP 0.0022 0.00 0.65
preelect_grand_coal 0.0032 0.00 0.60
preelect_SPD_alone -0.0005 0.00 0.56
preelect_CDU_alone 0.0000 0.00 0.54
election_SPD_Green -0.0053 0.00 0.80
election_SPD_FDP 0.0005 0.00 0.55
election_CDU_FDP 0.0033 0.00 0.70
election_grand_coal -0.0304 1.00 0.99
election_SPD_alone -0.0006 0.00 0.56
election_CDU_alone 0.0011 0.00 0.63
lag_election_SPD_Green -0.0053 0.00 0.82
lag_election_SPD_FDP -0.0054 0.00 0.81
lag_election_CDU_FDP -0.0106 0.29 0.94
lag_election_grand_coal 0.0113 0.03 0.83
lag_election_SPD_alone -0.0061 0.23 0.94
lag_election_CDU_alone -0.0014 0.00 0.68
Table A2. EBA with fixed effects: revenue
Variable β significant CDF
∆gdp 0.4033 1.00 1.00
∆gdp(lag) 0.1825 0.04 0.91
∆unemployed 0.0017 0.00 0.56
∆unemployed(lag) -0.0257 0.45 0.95
∆employed 0.0011 0.00 0.54
∆employed(lag) 0.1177 0.00 0.84
∆population -0.2421 0.00 0.67
∆population(lag) -0.1309 0.00 0.60
∆debt(lag) 0.0938 1.00 0.98
∆ratio_industry 0.3180 0.01 0.89
∆ratio_industry(lag) 0.1567 0.00 0.74
∆urbanity 0.0160 0.00 0.54
∆urbanity(lag) 0.0346 0.00 0.56
ratio_frontier 0.0107 0.00 0.83
area 0.0000 0.01 0.75
∆density -0.0382 0.00 0.56
coal_size 0.0028 0.06 0.83
treasury 0.0142 0.00 0.82
minist -0.0009 0.00 0.79
minist_ratio -0.0015 0.04 0.63
SPD_bund_land -0.0057 0.61 0.95
CDU_bund_land -0.0044 0.17 0.92
FDP_bund_land 0.0001 0.00 0.58
Green_bund_land -0.0005 0.00 0.58
br_land -0.0012 0.03 0.71
br_bund_land -0.0054 0.08 0.91
∆CDU_vote 0.0392 0.88 0.96
∆FDP_vote -0.0051 0.00 0.79
Table A2. EBA with fixed effects: revenue (continued)
Variable β significant CDF
SPD_Green_gov 0.0015 0.00 0.68
SPD_FDP_gov 0.0041 0.03 0.86
CDU_FDP_gov 0.0037 0.03 0.84
grandcoal -0.0200 1.00 1.00
ampel_gov 0.0590 1.00 1.00
change_gov -0.0008 0.00 0.59
change_gov_aggr 0.0004 0.00 0.62
change_mp 0.0099 0.15 0.92
preelect -0.0042 0.06 0.92
election -0.0023 0.00 0.78
lag_election 0.0040 0.06 0.91
bailout -0.0105 0.47 0.91
bailout_HB -0.0130 0.00 0.84
bailout_Saar -0.0046 0.00 0.68
change_gov_SPD_Green -0.0051 0.00 0.72
change_gov_SPD_FDP -0.0159 0.00 0.82
change_gov_CDU_FDP 0.0074 0.01 0.81
change_gov_grand_coal -0.0145 0.00 0.81
change_gov_SPD_alone -0.0078 0.00 0.80
change_gov_CDU_alone -0.0014 0.00 0.56
preelect_SPD_Green -0.0027 0.00 0.64
preelect_SPD_FDP -0.0043 0.00 0.70
preelect_CDU_FDP -0.0093 0.03 0.88
preelect_grand_coal -0.0256 0.84 0.95
preelect_SPD_alone -0.0038 0.00 0.75
preelect_CDU_alone -0.0032 0.00 0.79
election_SPD_Green -0.0087 0.00 0.85
election_SPD_FDP -0.0020 0.00 0.61
election_CDU_FDP -0.0008 0.00 0.56
election_grand_coal -0.0250 0.15 0.93
election_SPD_alone -0.0008 0.00 0.57
election_CDU_alone -0.0003 0.00 0.56
lag_election_SPD_Green 0.0073 0.00 0.84
lag_election_SPD_FDP 0.0038 0.00 0.67
lag_election_CDU_FDP 0.0119 0.11 0.93
lag_election_grand_coal -0.0236 0.31 0.93
lag_election_SPD_alone -0.0043 0.01 0.80
lag_election_CDU_alone 0.0045 0.00 0.86
Table A3. EBA without fixed effects: spending
Variable β significant CDF
∆gdp 0.2938 0.95 0.99
∆gdp(lag) 0.5634 1.00 1.00
∆bund_gdp 0.3922 0.97 0.99
∆bund_gdp(lag) 0.7309 1.00 1.00
∆interest -0.0034 0.90 0.97
∆interest(lag) 0.0023 0.78 0.95
∆unemployed -0.0710 1.00 1.00
∆unemployed(lag) -0.0395 0.95 0.99
∆employed 0.5087 1.00 1.00
∆employed(lag) 0.2320 0.92 0.97
∆population 1.2484 0.97 1.00
∆population(lag) 0.6250 0.94 0.99
∆debt(lag) -0.1499 1.00 1.00
∆ratio_industry 0.0422 0.08 0.67
∆ratio_industry(lag) 0.6487 0.95 0.99
∆urbanity 0.3193 0.09 0.92
∆urbanity(lag) -0.0645 0.00 0.63
ratio_frontier -0.0017 0.00 0.63
area 0.0000 0.01 0.81
∆density 0.4574 0.79 0.95
coal_size 0.0041 0.29 0.93
treasury -0.0054 0.03 0.66
minist 0.0008 0.06 0.84
minist_ratio -0.0057 0.00 0.74
SPD_bund_land -0.0012 0.00 0.67
CDU_bund_land -0.0006 0.00 0.59
FDP_bund_land 0.0024 0.00 0.77
Green_bund_land 0.0025 0.00 0.65
br_bund -0.0016 0.05 0.68
br_land 0.0002 0.00 0.58
br_bund_land -0.0007 0.00 0.59
∆CDU_vote -0.0353 0.84 0.97
∆FDP_vote 0.0030 0.00 0.71
∆bun_CDU_vote -0.0537 0.88 0.97
∆bund_FDP_vote 0.0165 0.84 0.96
Table A3. EBA without fixed effects: spending (continued)
Variable β significant CDF
SPD_Green_gov 0.0001 0.00 0.57
SPD_FDP_gov 0.0029 0.00 0.76
CDU_FDP_gov 0.0045 0.05 0.87
grand_coal -0.0059 0.02 0.75
ampel_gov -0.0056 0.00 0.63
bund_SPD_FDP_gov -0.0035 0.03 0.76
bund_CDU_FDP_gov -0.0003 0.01 0.62
change_gov 0.0083 0.83 0.97
change_gov_aggr 0.0023 0.38 0.92
change_mp 0.0120 0.85 0.96
preelect -0.0007 0.00 0.62
election 0.0027 0.00 0.82
lag_election -0.0045 0.36 0.94
bailout -0.0164 0.93 0.98
bailout_HB -0.0090 0.03 0.81
bailout_Saar -0.0091 0.84 0.96
change_gov_SPD_Green -0.0022 0.00 0.60
change_gov_SPD_FDP 0.0143 0.00 0.82
change_gov_CDU_FDP 0.0098 0.09 0.89
change_gov_grand_coal 0.0035 0.00 0.59
change_gov_SPD_alone 0.0111 0.03 0.89
change_gov_CDU_alone 0.0061 0.03 0.76
preelect_SPD_Green 0.0002 0.00 0.56
preelect_SPD_FDP -0.0109 0.11 0.92
preelect_CDU_FDP 0.0038 0.00 0.70
preelect_grand_coal 0.0151 0.00 0.81
preelect_SPD_alone -0.0018 0.00 0.64
preelect_CDU_alone -0.0025 0.00 0.73
election_SPD_Green 0.0031 0.00 0.65
election_SPD_FDP 0.0065 0.00 0.79
election_CDU_FDP 0.0144 0.86 0.97
election_grand_coal -0.0300 0.87 0.96
election_SPD_alone 0.0033 0.00 0.74
election_CDU_alone -0.0007 0.00 0.60
lag_election_SPD_Green -0.0008 0.00 0.58
lag_election_SPD_FDP -0.0053 0.00 0.76
lag_election_CDU_FDP -0.0111 0.12 0.91
lag_election_grand_coal 0.0123 0.00 0.79
lag_election_SPD_alone -0.0062 0.10 0.89
lag_election_CDU_alone -0.0025 0.01 0.72
Table A4. EBA without fixed effects: revenue
Variable β significant CDF
∆gdp 0.8847 1.00 1.00
∆gdp(lag) 0.3609 0.97 1.00
∆bund_gdp 1.2578 1.00 1.00
∆bund_gdp(lag) 0.3795 0.94 0.98
∆interest -0.0053 0.93 0.97
∆interest(lag) 0.0005 0.00 0.69
∆unemployed -0.0753 0.97 0.99
∆unemployed(lag) 0.0083 0.14 0.76
∆employed 0.3099 0.87 0.96
∆employed(lag) 0.0012 0.05 0.66
∆population 0.9811 0.94 0.99
∆population(lag) 0.5452 0.73 0.95
∆debt(lag) 0.1081 0.98 0.98
∆ratio_industry 0.8291 0.97 0.99
∆ratio_industry(lag) 0.0462 0.05 0.69
∆urbanity 0.1920 0.00 0.75
∆urbanity(lag) -0.2256 0.00 0.78
ratio_frontier 0.0088 0.00 0.80
area 0.0000 0.09 0.89
∆density 0.4607 0.53 0.91
coal_size 0.0047 0.12 0.86
treasury 0.0193 0.00 0.86
minist 0.0005 0.02 0.67
minist_ratio 0.0036 0.02 0.64
SPD_bund_land -0.0124 0.95 0.99
CDU_bund_land 0.0026 0.01 0.76
FDP_bund_land 0.0072 0.16 0.91
Green_bund_land -0.0022 0.00 0.65
br_bund 0.0046 0.09 0.88
br_land -0.0021 0.03 0.70
br_bund_land -0.0004 0.05 0.63
∆CDU_vote 0.0093 0.03 0.62
∆FDP_vote 0.0054 0.00 0.74
∆bun_CDU_vote 0.0139 0.01 0.66
∆bund_FDP_vote -0.0192 0.56 0.94
Table A4. EBA without fixed effects: revenue (continued)
Variable β significant CDF
SPD_Green_gov 0.0024 0.00 0.66
SPD_FDP_gov 0.0078 0.10 0.89
CDU_FDP_gov 0.0055 0.00 0.83
grand_coal -0.0221 0.95 0.98
ampel_gov 0.0544 0.99 0.97
bund_SPD_FDP_gov -0.0229 0.95 0.99
bund_CDU_FDP_gov 0.0097 0.92 0.98
change_gov 0.0068 0.02 0.86
change_gov_aggr 0.0011 0.00 0.71
change_mp 0.0201 0.96 0.98
preelect -0.0021 0.00 0.71
election -0.0052 0.11 0.90
lag_election 0.0059 0.27 0.93
bailout -0.0128 0.75 0.94
bailout_HB -0.0141 0.01 0.84
bailout_Saar -0.0065 0.00 0.71
change_gov_SPD_Green -0.0063 0.00 0.69
change_gov_SPD_FDP 0.0024 0.00 0.59
change_gov_CDU_FDP 0.0128 0.02 0.88
change_gov_grand_coal -0.0036 0.00 0.62
change_gov_SPD_alone 0.0014 0.00 0.59
change_gov_CDU_alone 0.0047 0.00 0.65
preelect_SPD_Green 0.0148 0.22 0.93
preelect_SPD_FDP -0.0017 0.00 0.58
preelect_CDU_FDP 0.0019 0.00 0.60
preelect_grand_coal -0.0216 0.05 0.86
preelect_SPD_alone -0.0087 0.00 0.86
preelect_CDU_alone -0.0059 0.00 0.85
election_SPD_Green -0.0047 0.00 0.66
election_SPD_FDP -0.0083 0.00 0.76
election_CDU_FDP -0.0039 0.00 0.65
election_grand_coal -0.0129 0.00 0.74
election_SPD_alone -0.0037 0.00 0.69
election_CDU_alone -0.0028 0.00 0.71
lag_election_SPD_Green 0.0064 0.00 0.75
lag_election_SPD_FDP -0.0034 0.00 0.63
lag_election_CDU_FDP 0.0035 0.00 0.64
lag_election_grand_coal -0.0116 0.00 0.75
lag_election_SPD_alone -0.0064 0.01 0.79
lag_election_CDU_alone 0.0136 0.98 0.99

























N. Rhine-Westph. 0.0042 0.054
Cons 0.0083 0.000
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